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Abstract 
The paper discusses the transferability of Danish ‘best practices’ in the coordination of preparation of 
EU legislation. The background to this question is that EU coordination systems in the CEE member 
states, are presently under pressure to live up to the new demands and opportunities flowing from 
membership of the EU. An important challenge is to provide systems that allow for greater 
parliamentary scrutiny over EU policy-making, and maintain the relatively good transposition records 
of new member states. In looking for a role model, we turn to Denmark, which is known among EU 
member states for the substantial role of its Parliament in EU policy making. The Danish model is 
highly democratic, as it involves the Danish parliament early and in a substantial way. It also is very 
efficient, since Denmark has, throughout the years, a consistently excellent record in the transposition 
of EU directives. While lesson-drawing from this model could be desirable to improve the democracy 
and efficiency of CEE EU systems, the question arises whether it is possible and/or advisable to 
transfer Danish practices to Central and Eastern Europe. We conclude that the most important lesson to 
draw is to synchronize the system of Parliamentary scrutiny with that of EU decision-making, so as to 
give parliaments more leverage over the latter process and bolster democracy. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As national law-making is becoming more and more intertwined with European law 
making in the members states of the EU, issues of efficiency and legitimacy of the 
European part of national policy making are becoming more and more important. 
Legislative activity in the areas where the European Union has competences has 
increased in recent years with the increases in the scope of EU policies and is 
nowadays a substantial part of domestic legislative activity. How substantial this part 
exactly is, is still unclear. While some have argued that up to 80 percent of economic 
regulations now come from Brussels, studies which have attempted to quantify the 
EU’s impact on legislative output have come up with a figure of 20 percent for both 
Germany and Austria (Töller, 1995, cited in Jenny and Müller, 2005; Jenny and 
Müller, 2005). Dutch researchers Bovens and Yesilkagit (2004, 16) find that of all the 
national binding rules in force on 31 July 2003, 25 % originated in Brussels. A 
comparable study for Denmark yielded the lower number of 9,6 percent (Blom-
Hansen and Christensen, 2004, cited in Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2004). 
 
Even if ‘only’ about 20 percent of domestic legislation originates as a result of the 
transposition of EU directives, the impact of catching up with the acquis in the new 
member states means this figure is in all probability greater.  Furthermore, the 
founding treaties and directly binding instruments such as regulations also impact on 
the national legal order and on member states’ economies and societies. This 
development poses a number of questions regarding the readiness of national 
constitutional and institutional arrangements in the EU member states to cope with a 
multi level system of governance. Preparing and passing legislation as if all of it 
originates with domestic parliaments is no longer a sound strategy for democracies 
which aim to preserve their representation and accountability arrangements. A whole 
range of problems related to democratic legitimacy arise and become more pressing: 
from a lack of realization that national parliaments are not full legislators when it 
comes to the transposition of directives to the increasing gap between citizens and 
elites, the former unaware of the extent to which politicians are unable to respond to 
their aggregated preferences when EU level bargaining overrides domestic politics. 
 
This paper will address only one aspect of this complex puzzle of Europeanization, 
namely, the changing arrangements for the preparation and passing of EU legislation 
as part of the national legislative cycle. What role have domestic parliaments in the 
new member states acquired in relation to the EU decision making process? What 
models can be useful in trying to find the best institutional arrangements for the new 
democracies? How can the optimal balance be achieved between legislative efficiency 
and democracy in determining national parliaments’ role in the EU policy making? 
The paper will address some of these important normative questions with reference to 
the case of Denmark, an EU member state that has been held up as a model for 
democratic accountability in EU decision making especially because of the role the 
Danish Parliament, the Folketing, plays in the EU decision making process. 
 
 
2. The role of the legislature in EU policy making in the new member states 
 
The last EU enlargement has been a focus for fascinated social scientists with the 
multiple processes of transformation and adaptation it set into motion. CEE countries 
have made a veritably impressive achievement in adapting to the EU, involving the 
adoption of the often-cited 80,000 pages of acquis legislation, under high pressures of 
conditionality. In the mid-1990s, candidate states preparing to start negotiations with 
the EU were driven to create new and more effective coordination systems for EU 
policy making, coordination systems which had to deal with complex and extensive 
negotiations. As the eight new member states from CEE entered the Union, these 
systems underwent further adjustment, seeking to secure the administrative capacity 
needed to take part in the EU policy process in all of its multiple arenas. 
 
This process of high pressure adaptation necessitated the design and 
institutionalization of rather effective machinery for dealing with the EU’s 
requirements. These systems had two important characteristics. First, already at the 
negotiations stage, it seemed that the only option for the candidates was to create 
executive-centered EU coordination systems, given the pressure of negotiations and 
the unprecedented adaptation requirements for the states acceding in the last 
enlargement and Bulgaria and Romania.3 The executive centered perspective has also 
been promoted by the European Commission and other international donors such as 
the World Bank as the only way to achieve decision making efficient enough to fulfill 
the enormous task of EU preparation. A more substantial role for parliaments was 
seen by advisors to potentially lead to a deadlocked system of preparing European 
level decision making.  Politicians from the CEE states have also expressed doubts 
that empowering parliaments in EU decision making will work for CEE conditions. In 
the words of Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Pal Csaky [involving parliament fully] ‘is 
a system that slows down the function of the whole system’ (Balogová, 2004). 
Whether or not this is indeed the case, will be discussed later in this paper, but the 
question why it may be important to consider increased parliamentary involvement 
should be addressed first. All in all, several authors have suggested that the 
enlargement process has resulted in an increase of the overall dominance of the 
executive (Grabbe, 2001, Dimitrova, 2004).  To remind the reader of crucial aspects 
of executive dominance, the preparation of negotiating positions, a central part of the 
negotiations determining future outcomes, was in the hands of working groups in 
ministries, negotiation themselves were a matter for the executives. 
 
A second crucial consequence of the huge adaptation challenge was that national 
parliaments did not have a chance to reject or even debate a great number of the laws 
they were passing. Driven by a remarkable sense of mobilization, they have 
functioned like more or less well-oiled machines for adopting EU legislation, which 
was not up for discussion. To deal with the sheer volume of legislation, many of the 
accession states created shortened procedures for the adoption of acquis related 
legislation. Fast track adoption procedures were used in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Romania (Malová and Haughton, 2002:111-112).  This has been a success 
for efficiency in the sense of passing a large number of laws in the relatively short 
period 1998-2004. At the same time, this strategy created ‘the risk of reducing 
parliaments to little more than rubber stamps’, undermining their institutionalization 
and weakening their legitimacy (Malová and Haughton, 2002:112). 
 
At present, however, the roles of the executive and parliament in CEE countries are 
open to change again. Now that CEE states are ‘in’, national machineries dealing with 
EU policies are being adjusted. The current situation presents the new member states 
with several opportunities and threats that must be dealt with. First, on the positive 
side, the CEE member states can finally have a say in shaping legislation. Also, on the 
side of ‘taking’ EU policies, there is no more role for conditionality, and ‘normal’ 
mechanisms and procedures can be used for transposition, application, and 
enforcement of EU law. There is no reason why rubber-stamping EU proposals has to 
continue, especially given the less-than flattering transposition records of some ‘old’ 
member states.  
 
Alongside with these opportunities, the newcomers also face various threats. First, 
even though the absence of conditionality may offer some leeway for the new member 
states in implementation, there is also the risk of falling back. As speedy transposition 
is an issue of high prominence on the agenda of the European Commission, the Court 
of Justice, and increasingly the Council of Ministers, the CEE member states are well-
advised to maintain their generally good performance.  
 
Second, and most importantly, their relative efficiency in adoption of the acquis may 
present a new challenge to democracy that could not be resolved by post communist 
political elites which have already found themselves in a tight place between 
international organizations’ demands and a public weary of reform. 4 Alongside the 
potential weakening of the institutionalization of committees mentioned by Malová 
and Haughton, (2002:112), the legislative marathon in the run up to accession has also 
used up the resources of political parties. Political parties have been directing their 
resources towards becoming the best at achieving the universally shared and popular 
goal of accession: a quest that included mobilizing party members with enough 
knowledge of the EU and finding resources and capacity to keep the negotiations 
machine going at full speed. 
 
Last but not least, the institutional imbalance and weakening the input of domestic 
politics into regulation in the domestic arena is far from over with accession. In all EU 
member states, the abovementioned increase in the volume of legislation which does 
not originate with national legislatures points towards a tendency of erosion of crucial 
aspects of good democracy such as accountability and transparency. It has been by 
now widely accepted that national parliaments have lost in importance as a result of 
the evolution of the EU system of decision making (Maurer, 2005). A partial remedy 
for this problem has emerged from the constitutional convention and the Constitution 
for Europe, yet whether it will lead to the substantial improvement in the role of 
national parliaments depends on the fate of the Constitution itself.5 Independently of 
this development, though, we have to ask how the position of parliaments in CEE 
member states vis-à-vis EU decision making has changed as the pressing need to 
catch up with legislation made in the EU is no longer that pressing? What will 
political elites and especially parliaments in the new member states do with EU 
decision-making, now that they are part of the multi-level legislative system of the EU?  
 
All in all, it is time to reconsider the systems for EU-coordination that have been put 
into place in the new member states. The question is to what extent these are geared 
towards the current opportunities and threats, or, more specifically, to what extent 
national parliaments should have discretion over EU related policy-making in the 
post-accession stage. Are parliaments to be mostly informed about policy positions to 
be submitted to the Council of Ministers or should they be involved more seriously in 
debate at the pre-negotiations stage when they can make a real difference to the 
negotiating position of their country? 
 
 
3. Existing arrangements for participation of national parliaments in EU policy 
making 
 
One year after enlargement, the question how the formal rules for parliamentary 
involvement will be put to use and become institutionalized in the new member states 
is still an open one. This is due to the fact that legislative arrangements are somewhat 
vague and open and parliaments have not had much practice in putting them to use in 
controlling the executive. The section that follows will use the formal legislative 
arrangements as a start for the discussion of the participation of parliaments in 
decision making.  It must be stressed, however, that the existing legislative provisions 
can work in different ways depending on how parliaments and executives in the new 
member states decide to put them into practice.  
 
Current arrangements for parliamentary involvement in the new member states vary, 
but attention for the role of parliaments has resulted in generally favorable 
institutional arrangements for their participation in EU decision making, at least on 
paper.  Already at the accession stage, some states gave their Parliaments a range of 
powers to discuss or approve negotiating positions and these arrangements were 
adjusted as states prepared to enter the Union.  
 
The main parameters to consider are the level of parliamentary control or scrutiny and 
the timing of parliamentary control.  In terms of scrutiny, the parliament’s role may be, 
in a scale of decreasing importance: 1/ to give a mandate (as in the Danish case); 2/ to 
consult and provide overall parameters for the government position in all cases; 3/to 
be consulted in some cases of perceived larger importance; and 4/ to be informed only. 
In terms of timing, the crucial division is between taking part before a Commission 
proposal becomes adopted at the Council of Ministers or afterwards, i.e. at the 
transposition stage. 
 
A quick overview of arrangements based on the legislative acts amending existing 
arrangements during the pre-accession period shows that a number of the new 
member states formally have quite extensive involvement of parliament, but none has 
a system going as far as to require a mandate. States which have, at least on the basis 
of the legislative arrangements, an obligatory system of consultation with Parliament 
before a proposal is discussed in the Council of Ministers can be considered to assign 
Parliament quite strong a role. These are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, and 
Poland. 
 
Other states, such as Estonia and Lithuania, seem to assign an intermediate role to 
their parliaments. These countries provide for involvement under certain conditions, 
e.g. important economic and social impact of legislation, but not for obligatory 
consultation on all policy positions. In Estonia, somewhat vaguely worded rules of 
procedure suggest parliamentary involvement in the case a Commission proposal 
provides for the amendment of a legislative act, but it is not clear when this would 
happen. The amendment to the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure Act, which entered into 
force on 15 March 2004, specifies that the government of Estonia submits legislation 
to the Riigikogu ‘if the scope of the legislation requires, pursuant to the Constitution 
of the Republic of Estonia, adoption, amendment or repealing of an Act or a 
resolution of the Riigikogu’  or ‘ 2) if its adoption would have substantial economic or 
social impact’ . The government can also refer to the Parliament’s European Affairs 
Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee for an opinion on any other ‘important 
affairs of the European Union’ as specified in the same law.6 From this arrangement, 
it becomes clear that a substantial amount of legislation could pass through the 
Estonian parliament, yet the actual percentage of laws it would scrutinize is likely to 
depend on the existing powers of delegation to ministers to pass legislation without an 
act of parliament. Furthermore, the impact provision can be interpreted broadly or 
narrowly, thus the field is open for actors to give the new rules meaning and content. 
 
Similarly, the Lithuanian arrangement provides for parliamentary scrutiny, without 
being too specific. The situation is also ambiguous in Hungary but it appears that the 
powers of the Hungarian parliament are more limited (Györi, 2004) than for example 
those of the Polish parliament. Last but not least, legislation in Slovenia seems to 
involve the Slovenian parliament even less by including only an obligation to inform, 
which is clearly less than obligatory consultation or even occasional consultation. 
  
A short overview of existing arrangements is provided by Table 1. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 
 
4. Denmark: a model to emulate? 
Just like the newcomers, the ‘old’ members pay different attention to the 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation. The involvement of national parliaments 
throughout the 1990s and up to the possible adoption of the EU constitution where 
some far-reaching changes are envisaged, can be plotted on a scale where Denmark is 
the most involved and France almost the least, although ‘retrospective accountability’ 
has increased there as well (Harlow, 1999:12). Whereas in most member states, the 
coordination and transposition of EU policy is a matter of the executive, only in 
Denmark can one speak not only of scrutiny but of a certain coordinating and 
leadership role for the Parliament (Harlow, 1999:12-13). This is why Denmark is the 
model to look at when considering issues of parliamentary leadership/role in EU law 
making. Denmark is also a model of efficiency in transposition which is all the more 
remarkable when we consider the country’s record of Euroscepticism. As is shown in 
Figure 1 below, Denmark has consistently had the best transposition score of the old 
member states. Also, as shown in Figure 2, it is one of the best states when it comes to 
correct transposition and application, with only 10 letters of formal notice received 
over five years. 
 
Figure 1 Average transposition rates per member state, 2000-2003 
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Source7: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/archmme_en.htm 
Figure 2 Number of letters of formal notice for incorrect transposition, 1998-
2002 
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While the powers of Danish parliament to give the Danish government an oral 
mandate for negotiations in the Council (before these negotiations have taken place) 
are widely commented upon, the implicit coordination role of the parliament in this 
process has received less attention. In fact, the whole process of EU policy making in 
Denmark can be said to have two sides: a government side and a parliament side, 
related to the activities of the Danish Parliament’s European Affairs Committee 
(Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  The coordination of EU policy making in 
Denmark is summarized in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Danish EU decision making process  
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As Figure 3 illustrates, there are four levels of coordination of EU policy making: the 
EU special committees, the EU committee, the government’s foreign policy 
committee and the Folketing´s European Affairs Committee. What is remarkable is 
that this tightly organized process is centered around the Friday discussion in the 
European Affairs Committee of the Danish Parliament, where ministers seek a 
mandate for the negotiating position they are to defend in the Council of Ministers.  
 
The European Affairs Committee (EAC), previously called the Market Relations 
Committee, is the most important actor in Parliament, although in recent years it has 
made an effort to include the special parliamentary committees as well. It has 
seventeen members, proportionally representing the political parties represented in 
Parliament. It is mostly comprised of senior MPs, among whom many former 
ministers (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 60). It is supported by a secretariat consisting of 22 
staff members and some 8 interns, which is the largest staff of all Parliamentary 
committees (Folketing et al, 2002: 23, Von Dosenrode, 1998; 61), The meetings of 
the European Affairs Committee normally take place on Fridays and deal with all the 
Council meetings taking place in the following week. The meetings typically take 2 to 
5 hours (Eliason, 2001: 200). 
 
Table 2 
Government  Parliament 
Ad hoc Tuesday  
(if needed) 
Thursday 
(if needed) 
Friday 
EU special committees EU committee Foreign Affairs 
Committee 
European Affairs 
Committee 
 
Source: Own interviews, February 2005. 
 
This table shows that far from having separate systems of dealing with the EU matters 
in the executive and in the parliament, in Denmark the two are working in synergy 
driven by the principle of the legislator having the final say.  This merging of the 
executive and political coordination systems at the pre-negotiation stages presents 
important advantages both to democracy and to efficiency. In terms of democracy, 
even though the mandate which ministers receive in the Parliament is oral and not 
legally binding, it is very important in the Danish political context and the discussion 
ensures that all actors are on board and there are ‘no surprises later’ (interview, 
February 2005). 
 
Deliberations in the EAC´s meeting are structured on basis of a so-called summary 
memorandum, which is an annotated agenda of an upcoming Council meeting 
(Folketing et al, 2002: 13). This is distributed Friday morning at the latest, eight days 
before the Council meeting, and a few hours before the EAC meeting (Nedergaard, 
1995: 124). For each pending proposal, the responsible minister has two options (Von 
Dosenrode, 1998: 60). First, he or she may simply brief the committee, if no decision 
by the Council of Ministers is to be expected. The second option is to propose a 
negotiating mandate (forhandlingsopslæg). If the latter is the case, the parties proceed 
by giving their positions, after which discussions may ensue. Finally, the Chairman of 
the Committee presents the conclusion, after counting the number of votes.  
 
The preparatory work in order for the Parliament to be able to formulate its opinion, is 
done by the ministries in making the so-called basic memorandum (grundnotat). This 
is a standardized document, composed by the special committees dealing with a 
proposal in the Parliament, which must be sent to the EAC within four weeks after a 
Commission proposal is made. Over the course of the negotiation process, the memo 
may be modified, after which it is called a topical memorandum (Folketing et al, 2002: 
13). It is usually quite elaborate, comprising 5 to 20 pages and contains: a description 
of the Commission proposal, its legislative and financial consequences, previous 
considerations by the EAC, possible compromise proposals by the Presidency, 
amendments proposed by the European Parliament, its itinerary through the EU 
institutions, and the opinion of interest groups (Folketing, 2002, 7; Pedersen, 2000: 
230; Von Dosenrode, 1998: 61). Since January 2005 this memorandum also contains 
the proposed government position. Independent of this, Parliament also receives all 
Commission proposals directly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as lists 
of all the proposals received (Folketing, 2002: 5-6). 
 
Interview evidence suggests that working on Commission proposals with a view to 
the parliamentary discussion increases the willingness of civil servants to include 
special interests in the sectoral committees where much of the initial discussion and 
negotiation over a proposal takes place. This is in order, to prevent them from ‘taking 
revenge’ later, when the proposal goes to Parliament (Interview, February 2005). 
 
Last but not least, when it comes to democracy, Parliament is not the only forum for 
Danish citizens to express their views. In Denmark, the nearly impossible task of 
making a democratic success of EU policy is accomplished by combining the 
parliamentary debate with numerous referenda giving citizens a direct opening to 
decide on important issues related to the EU.8 The combination of parliamentary 
mandate and referenda ensures that the executive cannot run ahead of itself with EU 
policies without taking into account citizens views. 
 
In terms of efficiency, Danish experts have argued that the fact that the parliament 
sees and debates negotiation proposals before they become adopted in the Council of 
Ministers and become EU law, facilitates and speeds up the process of transposition 
considerably. In fact, the Parliament is hardly involved at the transposition stage, as, 
in the words of a Danish expert, ‘The Danish parliament is not a legislator when it 
comes to already adopted EU issues’ (Interview, February 2005). 
 
Another aspect of the Danish system that increases efficiency by inducing discipline 
in both legislators and civil servants and which could present an interesting innovation 
for CEE states is the fact that all bills must be dealt with within one and the same 
parliamentary year. On the 2nd Tuesday in October, the new year starts. All 
outstanding bills must be withdrawn and submitted again in the new year (Mandrup 
Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 6) 
 
Having presented the advantages of the Danish system in terms of democracy and a 
certain kind of merger between the legislative activities at the EU level and at the 
national level, the remaining question is to what extent lesson-drawing from the 
Danish model is possible. What could be the advantages of the Danish model for the 
CEEs? Is it possible at all to adapt features of the Danish model in such entirely 
different democracies? 
 
 
5. Can CEE parliaments function like the Folketing in the EU policy making 
cycle? 
 
The arguments presented in the first section of this paper suggest that there is a good 
reason to at least consider a stronger role in EU decision making for parliaments in the 
CEE member states. Arguably the best model of such a stronger role is the Danish 
Folketing. The main strength of this model is that it allows for early parliamentary 
influence over EU decision-making, as well as mobilizing bureaucracy at an early 
stage. As a side-effect, it sows the seeds for speedy transposition of resulting EU 
directives. We argue here that such a system could potentially increase CEE member 
states’ leverage over both EU-decision-making and implementation.  
 
What is more, it seems highly suited to improve domestic participation and interest in 
EU affairs by reorienting the attention of domestic actors towards EU policy debates 
in parliament. The Danish case shows that a formal orientation of the process around 
the presentation of legislative proposals to parliament helps in focusing the attention 
of actors such as interest groups towards the parliament. It is, in our opinion, a better 
and more public forum for debate than the selective participation of organized 
interests in the drafting of new legislation at ministry level. At the same time, as the 
Danish practice also suggests, the anticipation of the parliamentary debate helps push 
ministries towards more involvement of interest groups. Thus societal actors get two 
chances to be involved in EU decision making, once in the ministries and later in 
parliamentary discussion. 
 
Finally, the Danish model very well fits the trend of politicization of EU affairs, 
which has been taking place over the last years in many older and new member states. 
For instance, it is in line with the increasing use of referenda inside the EU as a way to 
close the gap between citizens and the public. This in itself might force CEE elites 
and especially parliamentary parties to pay more attention to EU issues and take 
advantage of formal powers when they exist. Combining parliamentary involvement 
with referenda is another essential feature of the Danish system which makes it as 
democratic as it is and may be replicated in the recent drive for referenda across the 
EU. Finally, it seems to fit the current Euroskeptic, or Eurorealistic tone in some 
countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland. One of the reasons for the success 
of the Danish case is that, due to the high level of Euroskepticism, MPs can make 
political capital out of EU dossiers, which oils the system, which in a certain way  
works better when there is an incentive for politicians to address EU issues. 
 
The arguments presented above suggest that there are good normative reasons why 
new EU member states should give their parliaments power of scrutiny of EU 
legislation. However, practitioners often suggest that what is nice as a theory cannot 
work in practice for several reasons, some general and some linked to the realities of 
decision making in the new member states. A general problem is that transfer of 
institutional models or separate features can be highly problematic when other 
features of the institutional system do not fit the transferred arrangements. An 
example is provided by the fact that the Danish system relies heavily on horizontal 
coordination between governmental departments, which by and large is weak in the 
new member states. Second, it remains an open question whether the formal powers 
of CEE parliaments, possibly enhanced after the constitution, will remain meaningless 
in the absence of a culture of active participation. Third, several critics have raised the 
question whether such a far-reaching power as giving a mandate should be given to 
the allegedly slow and inefficient assemblies in CEE with regard to the dynamic area 
of EU policy making. Fourth, the system requires that MPs have a decent background 
in EU affairs; training hence should not be restricted to CEE civil servants.  
 
A fifth problem in adopting the Danish approach and hoping for a similar result is that, 
overall levels of accountability in both civil services and parliaments are far from the 
Danish example. It is possible that elites will use information strategically and 
parliaments will also use the opportunity to blame politically unpopular measures on 
the EU – something more difficult when they have had an active say in the policies 
adopted. Yet having one power control the other is a better bet on accountability than 
leaving the legislature out of the process for the sake of efficiency. 
 
Given these constraints, we would like to argue that it is currently unlikely that CEE 
parliaments would be able to cope as well as the Danish one with high level of 
scrutiny of all EU related proposals at the pre-negotiation stage. Therefore, we would 
suggest a less ambitious model, while still containing some of its key assets. First, we 
would argue that the crucial issue is not so much the level of scrutiny, but the timing. 
Even powers of consultation can be quite effective before a proposal is passed in the 
Council of Ministers of the European Union. Such powers would not limit the 
government’s room for maneuver as much as a mandate, but they would ensure that 
domestic political forces play a role when it matters. Dealing with parliament after a 
proposal has become law is a recipe for dissatisfaction and populism. For parliaments 
to be involved at the right stage of the process, a figurative synchronization of 
executives and legislative agendas would go a long way.9 A way to do this is for the 
executive coordinating body that deals with EU decision making to work on the 
proposal in preparation in such a way that it arrives on time at the parliamentary 
committee of European Affairs (see table 1 for an example). 
 
More generally, there is an argument to be made that increasing parliaments’ 
involvement can be initially achieved with formal institutionalization only and be 
improved later, provided the political will for maintaining such a design exists long 
enough to allow for further institutionalization. After all, the introduction of 
institutional innovation ‘formal rules first’ is not at all uncommon in the recent 
practice of post communist transformations. 
 
Following the introduction of the appropriate procedural rules, a crucial condition for 
meaningful parliamentary involvement will be the provision of quality information 
about the EU policy making by a strong and capable secretariat. Given the numerous 
demands on their time, even the most committed parliamentarians will not be able to 
process all EU related issues without administrative support, both in terms of staff 
numbers and institutional capacity.  
 
Furthermore, the European affairs committees should be supported by sectoral 
committees in order to give informed opinions on specific policy issues. Even in 
Denmark, the role of sectoral committees needs to be enhanced and the coordination 
between them and EU affairs committee improved. In CEE parliaments, much will 
depend on the institutionalization of committees as professional forums and a ground 
for compromises. But debate needs to also take place openly to the public to enhance 
the input legitimacy which is currently lacking in EU policy making. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Advice to the candidate states on how to organize their EU policy making systems has 
focused in recent years more on efficiency than on the overall implications for the 
decision making system in the new democracies. This paper argues that there is a 
pressing need to re-think this post accession. The argument for making parliaments 
real players is not a question of luxury upgrade of the system which is better run by 
civil servants. Even more than the old member states, CEE member states are prone to 
deficiencies in their democracies. EU membership, while improving output legitimacy, 
will exacerbate the gap between elites and citizens and more parliamentary 
involvement could address this problem by increasing input legitimacy. Thus making 
parliaments real, debating participants in the EU decision making cycle has the 
potential to address this new democratic deficit. In order to do this, however, 
parliaments need to have not only scrutiny and consultation powers but to be a real 
focal point in the system of EU coordination. This might limit the negotiation 
mandate for governments in the Council but provided parliaments are responsive to 
the citizens, would provide the EU project with legitimacy in the years to come. 
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Table 1 Parliaments involvement in decision making on EU issues 
 
New  (CEE) 
Member State Parliament 
President/ 
Chairman National Parliament Involvement Importance 
Czech 
Republic10 
Bicameral: 
 
- Poslanecká 
Sněmovna 
(Chamber of 
Deputies) 
- Senát 
- PhDr. Lubomir 
Zaoralek 
 
 
- Premysl Sobotka  
Role of the Committee on European Affairs 
 
The Senate deals with concrete initiatives after they are released 
by the European Commission and presents its opinion to the 
Government before this decides on the legislative initiative in 
the Council of the EU11.  
 
Constitution Amendment – article 10b (2000) 
Big 
Estonia12 Riigikogu Ene Ergma 
Role of Committees of European Affairs and Foreign Affairs 
 
Position on draft EU legislation when: 
 Constitutional requirement for reference to the Riigikogu 
 Economic or Social Impact 
 Government initiative or at the request of the European Union 
Affairs Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee 
Medium 
Hungary13 Országgyulés Szili Katalin 
Role of the Committee on European Integration Affairs 
 
The Government should provide information to the Parliament14 
The Constitutional amendment of December 2002 makes the 
Parliament responsible for the creation of a new act regulating 
the Parliament’s role for the period after the accession.15 
small to medium 
Latvia16 Saeima Presidium 
Role of the European Affairs Committee17 
 
Can rule on the official positions of the Government before they 
are communicated to the European Union institutions18 
Big 
Lithuania19 Seimas Artūras Paulauskas 
Role of committees, esp. Committee on European Affairs 
 
Parliamentary scrutiny on the activities of Governmental and 
other institutions related to European Union matters20. 
medium to big 
Poland21 
Bicameral 
Zgromadzenie 
Narodowe22: 
- Sejm 
 
 
- Senate 
 
 
 
 
WłodzimierzCimo
szewicz 
 
Longin Pastusiak 
Role of the European Affairs Committee23 
 
Examines documents submitted by the Polish Council of 
Ministers to European institutions. It is consulted before 
Government representatives go to the Council of the European 
Union.24 
 
Big 
Slovakia25 Národná Rada Pavol Hrusovsky Control Medium 
Slovenia26 
Bicameral Zbòr27: 
- Držani Svet 
- Držani Zbòr 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France Cukjati 
Role of the Committee on EU Affairs 
 
Indirect Role for the Parliament. Being informed28 
 
Before the 1 May 2004 the Government represented the 
positions of Slovenia to the National Assembly before going to 
the EU Council. 
After the 1 May the Government has to provide information to 
the working bodies of the National Assembly on the appropriate 
application of the Cooperation Act so that they are able to take 
positions before the vote of the representatives of the 
Government in the EU Council at the ministerial level.29 
small to medium 
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